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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Raymond Ross appeals from a broad filing injunction 
issued against him by the Bankruptcy Court after he and his 
wife used the bankruptcy process to stave off the sheriff’s 
sale of their home.  Ross argues that, as a matter of law, a 
bankruptcy court may never issue a filing injunction against a 
Chapter 13 debtor who requests voluntary dismissal under 11 
U.S.C. § 1307(b) because doing so would undermine the 
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debtor’s statutory rights.  We disagree, and hold that a 
bankruptcy court does indeed have the authority to issue a 
filing injunction even in the context of approving a debtor’s 
§ 1307(b) voluntary dismissal because nothing in the 
Bankruptcy Code’s express terms says otherwise.   
 However, we also find that the Bankruptcy Court’s 
filing injunction against Ross cannot survive this appeal due 
to this case’s particular circumstances.  The Bankruptcy Court 
provided no reasoning for the broad nature of its filing 
injunction, which went well beyond what had been requested 
and what the Bankruptcy Court found appropriate in the case 
of Ross’s similarly-situated wife.  Accordingly, we will 
vacate the injunction and remand this matter for further 
proceedings. 
I.  
 Appellant Raymond Ross and his wife Sandra have 
lived in their home in Ambler, Pennsylvania, since 1993.  In 
2003, the Rosses took on a mortgage from Appellee 
AmeriChoice Federal Credit Union.  The Rosses fell behind 
on their payments, and in 2012 AmeriChoice filed a 
foreclosure action in Pennsylvania state court.  The state court 
entered default judgment against the Rosses, and 
AmeriChoice scheduled a sheriff’s sale to be held on October 
30, 2013.  Ross v. AmeriChoice Fed. Credit Union, 530 B.R. 
277, 280 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2015).   
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 The day before the sheriff’s sale, Raymond1—acting 
alone, without Sandra—filed the first of the Rosses’ three 
relevant Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.  Raymond’s first 
petition triggered Chapter 13’s automatic stay and put a halt 
to the sheriff’s sale, but was dismissed about six months later 
after Raymond failed to make required payments.  
AmeriChoice rescheduled the sheriff’s sale for August 27, 
2014.     
 On the day of the rescheduled sale, Raymond filed a 
second Chapter 13 petition—the one that led to this appeal—
stalling the sale for a second time.  The Bankruptcy Court 
quickly granted AmeriChoice relief from the automatic stay, 
and the sheriff’s sale was rescheduled yet again, this time for 
October 29, 2014.  On that day, however, Sandra filed her 
own Chapter 13 petition, delaying the sale of the Rosses’ 
property a third time.  In re Sandra Dixon-Ross, No. 15-CV-
581, 2016 WL 1056776, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2016).  
Sandra’s case was assigned to the same Bankruptcy Judge 
overseeing Raymond’s case, and a week later the court 
dismissed Sandra’s petition for failure to obtain required pre-
petition credit counseling.  Id.   
 In Raymond’s second case, AmeriChoice filed a 
motion under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) to either convert 
Raymond’s case to Chapter 7 or dismiss it altogether due to 
what AmeriChoice saw as Raymond’s bad faith use of the 
bankruptcy process.  The Bankruptcy Court scheduled a 
hearing on the motion.  About two weeks prior to the hearing, 
                                              
 1  For sake of clarity, we will refer to Appellant 
Raymond Ross hereinafter by his first name only, and his 
wife by her first name, Sandra. 
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Raymond filed a motion to postpone the hearing due to a 
scheduling conflict and his anticipated absence from the state.  
The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion to postpone a week 
later.  Raymond then requested, the day before his hearing, 
that his case be dismissed pursuant to § 1307(b). 
 Raymond did not appear at the hearing on 
AmeriChoice’s motion.  AmeriChoice did appear, and 
indicated that its preference would be for the Bankruptcy 
Court to convert Raymond’s case to Chapter 7; dismissal was 
its second choice.  If the Bankruptcy Court decided to 
dismiss, AmeriChoice requested that the court also issue one 
of two proposed filing injunctions:  a filing injunction 
“barring future filings [of both Raymond and Sandra Ross] 
for 180 days,” or a filing injunction “barring the use of the 
automatic stay in any future filings by either one of them.”  
(Addendum to Amicus Br. at 24 (transcript of hearing).)  The 
Bankruptcy Judge expressed due process concerns with the 
prospect of issuing an order that extended to Sandra because 
the hearing was held only in Raymond’s case and Sandra had 
not been given notice.  The Judge instead suggested that if 
AmeriChoice wanted a filing injunction entered against 
Sandra, it should return to Sandra’s case and request one 
there.  Neither the Bankruptcy Judge nor AmeriChoice 
mentioned or discussed Raymond’s request for dismissal at 
the hearing.  Following the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court 
issued an Order dismissing Raymond’s case “with prejudice,” 
and further providing that “the Debtor is not permitted to file 
another bankruptcy case without express permission from this 
Court.”  (App. 205.)   
 AmeriChoice took the Bankruptcy Judge’s advice and 
a week later filed a motion in Sandra’s case, requesting that a 
filing injunction be entered against her as well.  In re Sandra 
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Dixon-Ross, 2016 WL 1056776, at *1.  AmeriChoice 
suggested as relief the same two alternatives it had proposed 
in Raymond’s case:  a general restriction on all Sandra’s 
filings for 180 days, or an order granting blanket relief from 
the automatic stay for any claims against the Rosses’ Ambler 
property for the indefinite future.  Id.  It did not request the 
broad restriction that the court had already entered against 
Raymond.  The Bankruptcy Judge granted the motion, but 
this time the order extended only to what AmeriChoice 
requested:  Sandra was “enjoined from filing another 
bankruptcy for 180 days of the date of this Order,” and the 
automatic stay was not to “operate against actions to enforce 
[AmeriChoice’s] mortgage foreclosure judgment” on the 
Rosses’ property.  In re Sandra Dixon-Ross, No. 14-18608, at 
*1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2015).  Sandra lost an appeal in 
the district court, and did not further appeal her case.  
Raymond unsuccessfully appealed his second case to the 
District Court, Ross, 530 B.R. at 282, and then filed the 
present appeal. 
 In the midst of this litigation, AmeriChoice completed 
the sheriff’s sale, only to have the foreclosure undone when 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the Rosses never 
received proper notice in the state action.  AmeriChoice Fed. 
Credit Union v. Ross, 135 A.3d 1018, 1023-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2015).  The Rosses also filed a federal action against 
AmeriChoice and other defendants, and eventually the parties 
entered into a near-global settlement, where the Rosses 
promised to make payments on their debt and AmeriChoice 
promised to abandon its foreclosure action.  See Ross v. 
AmeriChoice Fed. Credit Union, No. 15-2650, ECF No. 28 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016). 
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 The lone unsettled issue is the Bankruptcy Court’s 
filing injunction against Raymond, which remains in place.2 
II.  
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 157.  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) to review the Bankruptcy Court’s 
dismissal order.  And we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Our task is to “stand in the shoes” of the 
District Court and review the Bankruptcy Court’s decision 
anew.  In re Pransky, 318 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting In re Krystal Cadillac Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 
142 F.3d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1998)).  “[W]e review a 
bankruptcy court’s ‘legal determinations de novo, its factual 
findings for clear error, and its exercises of discretion for 
abuse thereof.’”  In re Miller, 730 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting In re Michael, 699 F.3d 305, 308 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2012)).  The issuance of a filing injunction is an exercise of 
discretion.  Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 331 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
                                              
 2  Raymond proceeds pro se in this appeal.  Because of 
the important and unsettled nature of the power of a 
bankruptcy court to issue a filing injunction in response to a 
Chapter 13 debtor’s motion for voluntary dismissal, we 
appointed counsel to serve as an Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Raymond in this appeal.  We express our gratitude to court-
appointed amicus, who provided valuable assistance to the 
Court. 
Case: 15-2222     Document: 003112643418     Page: 7      Date Filed: 06/06/2017
8 
 
III.  
 Raymond’s appeal raises two main issues:  (1) whether 
the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a bankruptcy court from 
issuing a filing injunction against a debtor who requests 
voluntary dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b), and 
(2) whether this case’s particular facts and circumstances 
indicate that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in 
issuing a broad filing injunction.  We hold that the answer to 
the first question is no, but find the answer to the second is 
yes.   
A.  
 Raymond’s first argument is that bankruptcy courts 
may not impose a filing injunction after a debtor has 
motioned for voluntary dismissal pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1307(b).  Bankruptcy courts possess a general statutory 
authority to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the 
Bankruptcy Code.  11 U.S.C. § 105(a).  And bankruptcy 
courts “may also possess ‘inherent power . . . to sanction 
‘abusive litigation practices.’”  Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 
1188, 1194 (2014) (quoting Marrama v. Citizens Bank of 
Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 375-76 (2007)).  But these broad 
“equitable powers . . . are not without limitation.”  In re 
Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).  
As relevant here, for example, a bankruptcy court’s general 
authority does not extend to actions that conflict with 
“specific,” “explicit,” and “express” terms of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1195-97.     
 In this vein, Raymond argues the Bankruptcy Court’s 
filing injunction is not authorized by its general authority 
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because it conflicts with the express terms of § 1307(b).  
Section 1307(b) states that a bankruptcy court “shall” dismiss 
a Chapter 13 case on the “request” of the debtor unless the 
debtor’s case has already been converted from some other 
chapter of the code.  11 U.S.C. § 1307(b).3  There is a split in 
authority as to just how mandatory this right to dismissal 
really is, and the Third Circuit has yet to weigh in.  Some 
courts hold that the statute’s command is mandatory and 
grants a debtor an “absolute” right to dismissal—if a debtor 
requests dismissal, then the court must dismiss; no 
exceptions.  See, e.g., In re Barbieri, 199 F.3d 616, 620-21 
(2d Cir. 1999) (reasoning that reading a bad faith exception 
into § 1307(b) would undermine § 303’s procedures 
governing the initiation of an involuntary Chapter 7 case); In 
re Procel, 467 B.R. 297, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying 
Barbieri’s rule after holding that Barbieri was not overruled 
or abrogated by Marrama, 549 U.S. at 365); In re Williams, 
435 B.R. 552, 560 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (same).  Other 
courts read the statute to contain an exception that permits a 
bankruptcy court to delay ruling on a bad faith debtor’s 
request for dismissal and instead first address a creditor’s 
competing motion to dismiss the case or convert it to 
                                              
 3 The precise language of section 1307(b) is as 
follows:   
 
On request of the debtor at any time, if the case 
has not been converted under section 706, 1112, 
or 1208 of this title, the court shall dismiss a 
case under this chapter.  Any waiver of the right 
to dismiss under this subsection is 
unenforceable. 
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Chapter 7.  See, e.g., In re Jacobsen, 609 F.3d 647, 649 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that Marrama requires the court to read-
in a bad faith exception); In re Rosson, 545 F.3d 764, 772, 
773 n.12 (9th Cir. 2009) (same).  Raymond argues we should 
side with Barbieri, and therefore the Bankruptcy Court erred 
in granting AmeriChoice’s motion over Raymond’s dismissal 
request because a debtor’s § 1307(b) right to dismissal is 
absolute. 
 But we need not weigh in on this split in authority 
today, because even if Raymond were correct, and § 1307(b) 
required the Bankruptcy Court to grant Raymond’s request 
for dismissal before considering AmeriChoice’s motion, the 
Bankruptcy Court could have just as easily attached its filing 
injunction to Raymond’s requested dismissal order.  
Raymond argues that such a conclusion cannot be correct 
because it would undermine the purpose of several other 
Bankruptcy Code provisions that already address the problem 
of repeat-filers and bad-faith debtors:  § 727(a)(8) and 
§ 1328(f), which limit the availability of two discharges to the 
same petitioner; § 362(b)(4), which diminishes the effect of 
the automatic stay for repeat-filers; and § 109(g), which 
effectively imposes a 180-day filing injunction on a certain 
subset of repeat-filers who act in bad faith.  But whether or 
not the Bankruptcy Court’s filing-injunction order 
undermines these sections’ purposes is not the question; all 
that matters is the “express” and “explicit” terms of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  For example, in Marrama v. Citizens 
Bank, the Supreme Court upheld an order as falling under the 
bankruptcy court’s general authority, and brushed back an 
argument that its decision would undermine the purpose of 
other Code provisions.  See 549 U.S. at 375; see also id. at 
380 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority did not 
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adequately consider the “purpose” of other Code provisions).  
What mattered to the Court was that there was “[n]othing in 
the text” of the Code that prohibited the bankruptcy court’s 
order.  Id. at 374-75.  By comparison, when the Supreme 
Court reversed an order in Law v. Siegel for exceeding the 
bankruptcy court’s general authority, it held that the order 
conflicted with the “explicit mandates” and “express terms” 
of 11 U.S.C. § 522, in light of two specific aspects of that 
section.  134 S. Ct. at 1196 (referencing specific textual 
language granting debtors the right to seek exemptions and a 
“meticulous” and “detailed” list of exceptions and 
limitations).  Raymond’s case is much more like Marrama 
than Law v. Siegel.  Raymond highlights “nothing in the text” 
of § 1307(b) that prohibits the entry of a filing injunction 
alongside a § 1307(b) dismissal order, and the purposes 
behind the other cited statutory provisions are irrelevant. 
 Raymond also argues against this conclusion by comparing 
§ 1307(b) to the analogous Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
governing voluntary dismissals by a plaintiff, Rule 41(a)(1).4  
                                              
 4 Rule 41(a)(1) provides: 
 
(a) Voluntary Dismissal. 
(1) By the Plaintiff. 
(A) Without a Court Order. Subject to Rules 
23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and any applicable 
federal statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an 
action without a court order by filing: 
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Rule 41 states in its text that a notice of voluntary dismissal is 
effective without a court order and the dismissal is without prejudice 
if the plaintiff requests dismissal and has not previously had “any 
federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim” 
voluntarily dismissed.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B).  Thus, Raymond 
suggests that had the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governed the 
Bankruptcy Court’s procedures in Raymond’s case, the Bankruptcy 
Judge arguably would have been prohibited from entering the filing 
injunction because Raymond’s § 1307(b) request for voluntary 
dismissal was his first.5  The problem with this Rule 41 analogy, 
                                                                                                     
(i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing 
party serves either an answer or a motion for 
summary judgment; or 
(ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all 
parties who have appeared. 
(B) Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation 
states otherwise, the dismissal is without 
prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously 
dismissed any federal- or state-court action 
based on or including the same claim, a notice 
of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the 
merits. 
 5 Raymond’s first bankruptcy petition was dismissed 
involuntarily in response to a motion to dismiss filed by the 
Trustee; it was not dismissed voluntarily.  See In re Raymond 
Ross, No. 13-19412, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2014) 
(dismissal order).  Prior to dismissal, Raymond and 
AmeriChoice apparently entered into a stipulation in an 
attempt to relieve AmeriChoice from the automatic stay and 
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however, is once again the text of § 1307(b):  whereas Rule 41 
requires in specific and express terms that dismissal is automatic and 
without prejudice, § 1307(b) contains no similar textual hook.   
 The Bankruptcy Court therefore possessed the general 
authority to issue a filing injunction against Raymond. 
B.  
 The Bankruptcy Court’s filing injunction against 
Raymond is still problematic, however, due to the specific 
circumstances of this case.  A court may not issue orders that 
are “arbitrary or irrational,” and we may vacate decisions for 
an abuse of discretion on that basis.  United States v. Bailey, 
840 F.3d 99, 117 (3d Cir. 2016).  Furthermore, when 
reviewing for abuse of discretion, we grant less deference to 
court decisions that are unaccompanied by reasoning.  Id.  
Although we may affirm a judgment of a lower court for any 
reason supported by the record, Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 
F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011), we are not obligated to search 
the record for reasons to affirm and may vacate or remand if 
the lower court declines to provide reasoning supporting its 
decision.6   
                                                                                                     
avoid future litigation between the parties.  AmeriChoice’s 
Mot. to Convert or Dismiss, Ex. P ¶¶ 10-13, Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
Case No. 14-16866, Docket No. 41.  But that stipulation did 
not purport to resolve Raymond’s first Chapter 13 case in its 
entirety, and was not the basis for the Bankruptcy Court’s 
dismissal. 
 6 See United States v. Garza, 593 F.3d 385, 391 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that the district court abused its discretion 
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 Here, three aspects of the filing injunction, none of 
which were explained by the Bankruptcy Court, together 
suggest the Bankruptcy Judge abused his discretion in issuing 
the broad and indefinite filing injunction.  First, the filing 
injunction went beyond what AmeriChoice requested.  
AmeriChoice only asked that the Bankruptcy Court either 
restrict Raymond’s filings for 180 days or bar the application 
of the automatic stay to AmeriChoice’s attempts to sell the 
Rosses’ property.  The Bankruptcy Court, however, barred 
Raymond from making any bankruptcy filings anywhere for 
the indefinite future—there was no temporal or geographic 
limitation—except when the court grants its express 
permission.   
 Second, the filing injunction against Raymond is 
several degrees harsher than the filing injunction against 
Sandra, even though the same Bankruptcy Judge oversaw 
each spouse’s case and gave no indication that the two are not 
similarly situated.  Similarly, even though it appears that 
Raymond and Sandra are similarly situated, the Bankruptcy 
Court limited its filing injunction in Sandra’s case to what 
                                                                                                     
when it sua sponte transferred a case to a not very convenient 
venue and did not provide reasoning); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking 
Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 816 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(vacating the district court’s award of damages under the 
Lanham Act for lack of reasoning); Stuebben v. Gioiosi (In re 
Gioioso), 979 F.2d 956, 961 (3d Cir. 1992) (remanding to the 
bankruptcy court because it failed to “provide a sufficient 
basis for reviewing its exercise of discretion” in imposing 
sanctions under Rule 9011). 
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AmeriChoice requested while in Raymond’s case went 
beyond their request. 
 Third, 11 U.S.C. § 109(g) is persuasive authority that a 
180-day filing restriction may have been sufficient in 
Raymond’s case.  As mentioned above, that section imposes 
an effective 180-day filing restriction on debtors who have 
either (1) willfully failed “to abide by orders of the court” or 
“to appear before the court in proper prosecution of the case,” 
or (2) requested and received dismissal in advance of a court 
ruling on a creditor’s request for relief from the automatic 
stay.  11 U.S.C. § 109(g).  Thus, the section imposes a 180-
day filing restriction on a certain subset of bad faith debtors.  
The section almost certainly did not apply here because 
Raymond appeared before the Bankruptcy Court, apparently 
followed the court’s orders, and did not file his motion in 
response to AmeriChoice’s previously-granted motion for 
relief from the automatic stay but rather its motion to dismiss 
or convert Raymond’s case.  Nonetheless, if 180 days is often 
sufficient for the bad faith debtor contemplated by §109(g), 
180 days may have been sufficient for Raymond too. 
 These three aspects of the Bankruptcy Court’s filing 
injunction together, left unexplained by any court reasoning, 
lead us to the conclusion that the court abused its discretion in 
issuing such a broad filing injunction.  If any one of these 
factors had not been present, or if the Bankruptcy Court had 
provided oral or written reasoning describing a legitimate 
rationale for the broad nature of its filing injunction, then 
perhaps we would have arrived at a different result, because 
even broad filing restrictions are common and often justified.  
See, e.g., Olson v. Ramsey Cty., No. 15-3131, 2015 WL 
5778478, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2015) (restricting the 
plaintiff, for the indefinite future, from “filing new cases in 
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this District Court unless he is represented by counsel or 
receives prior written authorization from a judicial officer in 
this District Court”); Riches v. Parcells, No. 1:07-cv-1891, 
2008 WL 117887, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008) (restricting 
the Clerk of Court, for the indefinite future, from accepting 
any of the plaintiff’s future civil complaints if the plaintiff has 
not paid the filing fee).  Nevertheless, a broad filing 
injunction is an “extreme remed[y]” that “should be narrowly 
tailored and sparingly used.”  In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 
F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1989).  Given both the breadth of the 
injunction in this case and the Bankruptcy Court’s failure to 
articulate why such an injunction was warranted by Ross’s 
conduct, a remand is warranted.7   
IV.  
 We will vacate the Bankruptcy Court’s filing-
injunction order and remand the case to the Bankruptcy Court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
                                              
 7 Because we vacate the filing injunction on this basis, 
we need not address Raymond’s final argument in the 
alternative, that the Bankruptcy Court violated his procedural 
due process rights. 
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